Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games by Reinhard Selten
The concept of a perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames. (Selten 1965 and 1973) . Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game. It is necessary to reexamine the problem of defining a satisfactory non-cooperative equilibrium concept for games in extensive form. Therefore a new concept of a perfect equilibrium point will be introduced in this paper.1)
In retrospect the earlier use of the word "perfect" was premature. Therefore a perfect equilibrium point in the old Sense will be called "subgame perfect". The new definition of perfectness has the property that a perfect equilibrium point is always subgame perfect but a subgame perfect equilibrium point may not be perfect.
It will be shown that every finite extensive game with perfect recall has at least one perfect equilibrium point.
Since subgame perfectness cannot be detected in the normal form, it is clear that for the purpose of the investigation of the problem of perfectness, the normal form is an inadequate representation of the extensive form. It will be convenient to introduce an "agent normal form" as a more adequate representation of games with perfect recall.
1) The idea to base the definition of a perfect equilibrium point on a model of slight mistakes as described in section 6 is due to John C. Harsany1. The author's earl1er unpublished attempts at a formalization of thi~concept were less satisfactory. I am very grateful to John C. Harsanyi who strongly influenced the content of this paper.
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Extensive games with perfect recall
In this paper the words extensive qame will always refer to a finite game in extensive form. Agame of this kind can be described as a sextuple.
(1) r = (K,P,U,C,p,h) where the constituents K,P,U,A,p and h of rare as follows:2)
The game tree: The game tree K is a finite tree with a distinguished vertex 0, the origin of K. The sequence of vertices and edges which connects 0 with a vertex x is called the path to x. We say that x comes before y or that y comes after x if x is different from y and the path to y contains the path to x. An endpoint is a vertex z with the property that no vertex comes after z. The set of all endpoints is denoted by Z. A path to an endpoint is called a play. The edges are also called alternatives. An alternative at x is an edge which connects x with a vertex after x. The set of all vertices of K which are not endpoints, is denoted by X.
The player partition: The player partition P = (Po,...,Pn) partitions X into player~.
Pi is called player i's player set (Player 0 is the "random" player who represents the random mechanisms responsible for the random decisions in the game.) A player set may be empty. The player sets Pi with i = 1,...,n are called personal player sets. The information partition: For i = 1,...,n a subset u of Pi is called eligible (as an information set) if n is not empty, if every play intersects u at most once and if the number of alternatives at x is the same for every XEU. A subset UEPO is called elegible if it contains exactly one vertex.The information partition U is a refinement of the player partition P tnto eligible subsets u of the player sets. These sets u are called information~.The information sets u with u~Pi are called information sets of playe~i. The set of all information
2) The notation is different from that used by Kuhn (Kuhn 1953) -3 -sets of player i is denoted by Ui. The information sets of player 1,...,n are called personal information sets.
The choice partition: For UtU let Au be the set of all alternatives at vertices XEU. We say that a subset c of Au is eliqible (as a choice) if it contains exactly one alternative at x for every vertex XEU. The choice partition C partitions the set of all edges of K into eligible subsets c of the Au with UtU. These sets c are called choices. The choices c which are subsets of Au are called choices~u.
The set of all choices at U is denoted by Cu. A choice at a personal information set is called a personal choice. A choice which is not personal is a random choice. We say that the vertex x comes after the choice c if one of the edges in c is on the path to x. In this case we also say that c i8 on the path to x. The probability assignement: A probability distribution Pu over Cu is called completely mixed if it assigns a positive probability pu(c) to every CtCu. The probability assignment p is a function which assigns a completely mixed pro- 3) Is there any need to consider games where the players are teams rather than individuals? In the following we shall try to argue that at least as far as strictly non-cooperative game theory is concerned the answer to this question is no.
In principle it is always possible to model any given interpersonal conflict situation in such a way that every person involved is a single player. Several persons who form a team in the sense that all of them pursue the same goals can be regarded as separate players with identical payoff functions. Against this view one might object that a team may be united by more than accidentally identical payoffs. The team may be a preestablished coalition with special cooperative possibilities not open to an arbitrary collection of persons involved in the situation. This is not a valid objection. Games with preestablished coalitions of this kind are outside the framework of strictly non-cooperative game theory. In a strictly non-cooperative game the players do not have any means of cooperation or coordination which are not explicitly modelled as parts of the extensive form. If there is something like a preestablished coalition, then the members must appear as separate players and the special possibilities of the team must be apart of the structure of the extensive game.
In view of what has been said no room is left for strictly non-cooperative extensive games without perfect recall. In the framework of strictly non-cooperative game theory such -5 -games can be rejected as misspecified models of interpersonal conflict situations.
2. Strategies, expected payoff and normal form
In this section several definitions are introduced which refer to an extensive game r = (K,P,U,A,p,h).
Local strategies: A local strategy biu at the information set UEUt is a probability distribution over the set Cu of the choices at U; a probability biu(c) is assigned to every choice c at u. A local strategy biu is called pure if it assigns 1 to one choice c at u and 0 to the other choices. Wherever this can be done without danger of confusion no distinction will be made between the choice c and the pure local strategy which assigns the probability 1 to c.
Behavior strategies: A behavior strategy bi of a personal player i is a function which assigns a local strategy biu to every UEUi. The set of all behavior strategies of player i is denoted by BiPure strategies: A pure strategy -i of player i is a function which assigns a choice c at u (a pure local strategy) to every UEUi. Obviously a pure strategy is a special behavior strategy. The set of all pure strategies of player i is denoted by TIi.
Mixed strategies: A mixed strategy qi of player i is a probability distribution over TIi:a probability qi(~i1 is assigned to every~iE TIi.The set of all mixed strategies qi of player i is denoted by Qi. Wherever this can be done without danger of confusion no distinction will be made between the pure strategy -i and the mixed strategy qi which assigns 1 to -i.pure strategies are regarded as special cases of mixed strategies.
-6 -Behavior strategy mixtures: a behavior strategy mixture si for player i is a probability distribution over Bi which assigns positive probabilities si (bi) to a finite number of elements of Bi and zero probabilities to the other elements of Bi. No distinction will be made between the behavior strategy bi and the behavior strategy mixture which assigns , to bi. The set of all behavior strategy mixtures of player i is denoted by Si. Obviously pure strategies, mixed strategies and behavior strategies can all be regarded as special behavior strategy Realization probabilities: A player i who plays a behavior strategy mixture si behaves as follows: He first employs a random mechanism which selects one of the behavior strategies bi with the probabilities si (bi). He then in the course of the play at every UEUi which is reached by the play selects one of the choices c at u with the probabilities biu(c). Let s = (s"...,sn) be a combination of behavior strategy mixtures. On the assumption that the si are played by the players we can compute a realization probability p(x,s) of x under s for every vertex XEK. This probability p(x,s) is the probability that x is reached by the play, if s is played. Since these remarks make it sufficiently clear, how p(x,s) is defined, a more precise definition of p(x,s) will not be given here. In order to compute the expected payoff vector for a mixed strategy combination, it is sufficient to know the normal form of r. The same is not true for combinations of behavior strategies. As we shall see,in the transition from the extensive form to the normal form some important information is lost.
3. Kuhn's theorem H.W. Kuhn has proved an important theorem on games with perfect recall (Kuhn 1953, p.213) . In this section Kuhn's theorem will be restated in a slightly changed form. For this purpose some further definitions must be introduced. As before, these definitions refer to an extensive game r=(K,p,U,A,p,h). .' J J
).I (c,x,s) = /_, ti (bi) biu (e) j=1
This shows that p(e,x,s) does not depend on the Sj with i;j.
Lemma 2: In every extensive game r with per feet reeall, on the region of those triples (c,x,s) where the eonditional choice probability ).I (e,x,s) is defined, we have (7) )j(e,x,s) = ).I (e,y,s) for XEU and YEU Proof: In agame with perfeet reeall for XEU,YEU and UEUi player i's ehoices on the path to x are the same ehoiees as his ehoices on the path to y. (This is not true for games without per feet reeall). Therefore at x and y the posterior probabilities for the behavior strategies bi oecurring in player ils behavior strategy mixture si are the same at both vertices. Consequently (7) fol--10 lows from (6).
Proof of Kuhn's theorem: In view of lemma 1 and lemma 2 the conditional choice probabilities at the vertices x in the player set Pi of a personal player can be described by a function~i (c,u,si) which depends on his behavior strategy mixture s1 and the information set u with XEU.
With the help of~i(c,u,si) we aonltruct the behavior strategy bi whose existence is asserted by the theorem. If for at least one s = (s1,...,sn) with si as component we havẽ (x,s) > 0 for some XEU, we define
The construction of ry local strategies be found.
bi is completed by assigning arbitrabiu to those UEUi where no such s can
It is clear that this behavior strategy bi and the behavior strategy mixture si are realizazion equivalent.
The significance of Kuhn's theorem: The theorem shows that in the context of extensive games with perfect recall one can restrict one's attention to behavior strategies. Whatever a player can achieve by a mixed strategy or a more general behavior strategy mixtures can be achieved by the realization equivalent and therefore also payoff equivalent bahavior strategy whose existence is secured by the theorem.
Subgame perfect equilibrium points
In this section we shall introduce some further definitions which refer to an extensive game r = (K,P,U,A,p,h) with perfect recall. In view of Kuhn's theorem only behavior strategies are important for such games. Therefore the concepts of a best reply and an equilibrium point are formally introduced for behavior strategies only. Remark: The concepts point can be defined mixtures. In view of of a best reply and an equilibrium analogously for behavior strategy Kuhn's theorem it is clear that for games with perfect recall an equilibrium point in behavior strategies is a special case of an equilibrium point in behavior strategy mixtures. The existence of an equilibrium point in behavior strategies for every extensive game with perfect recall is an immediate consequence of Kuhn's theorem together with Nash's weIl known theorem on the existence of an equilibrium point in mixed strategies for every finite game (Nash '951). -12 - point on every subgame of r.
A numerical example
The definition of a subgame perfeet equilibrium point excludes some cases of intu1tively unreasonable equilibrium points for extensive games. In this section we shall present a numerical example which shows that not every intuitively unreasonable equilibrium point is excluded by this definition. The discussion of the example will exhibit the nature of the difficulty.
The numerical example is the game of figure 1. Obviously this game has no subgames. Every player has exactly one information set. The game is agame with perfeet recall.
Since every player has two choices, Land R, a behavior strategy of player i can be characterized by the probability with which he selects R. The symbol Pi will be used for this probability. A combinat1on of behavior strategies is represented by a triple (P1,P2,P3).
As the reader can verify for himself without much difficulty the game of figure 1 has the following two types of equilibrium points:
Type 2: -14 -Now suppose that the players believe that a specific type 2 equilibrium point, say (0,1,1) is the rational way to play the game. Is it really reasonable to believe that player 2 will choose R if he is reached?
If he believes that player 3 will choose R as prescribed by the equilibrium point, then it is better for hirn to select L where he will get 4 instead of R where he will get 1. The same reasoning applies to the~ther type 2 equilibrium points, too.
Clearly, the type 2 equilibrium points cannot be regarded as reasonable. Player 2's choices should not be guided by his payoff expectations in the whole game but by his conditional payoff expectations at x3. The payoff expectation in the whole game is computed on the assumption that player 1's choice is L. At x3 this assumption has been shown to be wrong. Player 2 has to assurne that player 1's choice was R.
For every strategy combination (P1,P2,P3) it is possible to compute player 2's conditional payoff expectations for his choices Land R on the assumption that his information set has been reached. The same cannot be done for player 3. Player 3's information set can be reached in two ways. Consider an equilibrium point of type 1, e.g. the equilibrium point (1,1,0). Suppose that (1,1,0) is believed to be the rational way to play the game and assume that contrary to the expectations generated by this belief, player 3's information set is reached. In this case player 3 must conclude that either player 1 or player 2 must have deviated from the rational way of playing the game but he does not know which one. He has no obvious way of cornputinga conditional probability distribution over the vertices in his information set, which teIls hirn,with which probabilities he is at x1 and at x2 if he has to rnakehis choice.
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In the next seetion a model will be introdueed whieh is based on the idea that with some very small probability a player will make amistake. These mi stake probabilities do not direetly generate a eonditional probability distribution over the vertiee of player 3's information set. As we shall see in seetion 8 the introduetion of slight mistakes may lead to a strategie situation where the rational strategies add some small voluntary deviations to the mistakes.
A model of slight mistakes
There eannot be any mistakes if the players are absolutely rational. Nevertheless, a satisfaetory interpretation of equilibrium points in extensive games seems' to require that the possibility of mistakes is not eompletely exeluded. This ean be achieved by a point of view whieh looks at complete rationality as a lirniting ease of ineomplete rationality.
Suppose that the personal players in an extensive game r with perfeet recall are subjeet to a slight imperfeetion of rationality of the following kind. At every information set u there is a small positive probability E for the u breakdown of rationality. Whenever rationality breaks down, every choiee c at u will be seleeted with sorne positive probability q whieh may be thought of as dec termined by sorne unspecified psychological meehanisrn.
Eaeh of the probabilities E and q is assurned to be u e independentof all the other ones.
Suppose that the rational choice whieh seleets e with probability bability of the choiee c will be at u is a local strategy p . Then the total pro- Obviously, it is not important whether the Pc or the ßc are consider~d to be the strategic variables of the perturbed game r. In the following we shall take the A latter point of view. This means that in r every player i selects a behavior strategy which assigns probability distributions over the choices c at u to the information sets u of player i in such a way that the probability p c assigned to a choice c at u always satisfies the following condition:
The probability p is also restricted by the upper bound c 1-cu(1-qc); it is not necessary to introduce this upper bound explicitly since it is implied by the lower bounds on the probabilities of the other choices at the same information set. With the help of the notation condition (10) can be rewritten as follows: (12) for every personal choice c.
Consider a system of positive constants EC for the personal choices c in r such that The difficulties which should be avoided by a satisfactory definition of a perfect equilibrium point are connected to unreached information sets. There cannot be any unreached information sets in the perturbed game. If b is a behavior strategy combination for the perturbed game then the realization probability p(x,b) is positive for every vertex x of K. This makes it advantageous to look A at agame r as a limiting case of perturbed games r= (r,n).
In the following a perfect equilibrium point will be defined as a limit of equilibrium points for perturbed games. Let~be the interseetion of all k~m we have~m . For
Sinee the expeeted payoff depends eontinuously on the behabior strategy eombination this inequality remains valid if on both sides we take the limits for k+-. This yields: (18 ) Inequality (18) Up to now it has not been shown that perfeetness implies subgame perfeetnes. In order to do this we need a lemma on the subgame perfectness of equilibrium points for perturbed games. As in section 6 let Pi be the probability of player ils choice R. A behavior strategy combination can be represented ba a triple '"'k p = (P1,P2,P3)' The behavior strategy combinations for rare restrictedby the condition for i = 1,2,3
As we point '"'k ahall see, the perturbed game r k k k k P = (P1,P2,P3 ) whose components has only one equilibrium k Pi are as follows: '22 k Equilibrium property of p:
In the following it will be shown k Ak that p is an equilibrium point of r . Let us first look at the situation of player 3. For any p = (P"P2,P3) the realization probabilities p(x"p) and p(x2,p) of the vertices x, and x2 in the information set of player 3 are given by (24) and (25). (24) p(x"p)
Player 3's expected payoff under the condition that his information set is reached is 2p(x,p) if he takes his choice R and p(x2,p) ifAhe takes his choice L. Therefore P3 is a best reply to p in rk if and only if the following is true:
Therefore it follows by (27) that p~is a best reply to pk. k k P2 is best reply to P in view of (32). Ak P1 is a best reply to P in r if and only if the following is true:
Uniqueness of the equilibrium point: In the following it k Ak will be shown that P is the only equilibrium point of r .
We first exclude the possibilityP3~1/4. Suppose that p is an equilibrium point with P3 < 1/4. It follows by (33) that we have P2 = 1-e:k. Concequently 3P3 is smaller than P2 and (36) yields P1 = 1-e:k. Therefore (28) applies to P3. We have P3 = 1-Ek contrary to the assumption P3 < 1/4. (27) an equilibrium point p has the following property: (37 ) This together with P1 = 1-Ek yields
equilibrium point:
For k+-the This is the
converges to p =(1,1,1/4). equilibrium point of the test
Note that P1 is as near as possible to P1 = 1 since P1 k is the maximum probability 1 -Ek. Contrary to this P2 * * is not as near as possible to P2. The probability P2 is smaller than 1 -Ek by Ek(1+€k) / (1 -Ek). The rules of the perturbed game force player 2 to take his choice L with a probability of at least Ek but to this minimum probability he adds the "voluntary" probability €k(1+€k) / (1-€k). In this sense we can speak of a voluntary deviation from the limit equilibrium point. brium points. We construct a test sequence r , r2, ... Imperfectness of the equilibrium points of type 2: In the following it will be shown that the equilibrium points of '* '* type 2 fails to be perfect. Let p = (0,P 2 ,1) be an equili-1 2 brium point of type 2 and let r , r ,... be a test aequence and (b) that For suffieiently small E it follows from (a) k k P2 is not a best reply to P ; we must have P2 < E for k k player 2's best reply to p anQ P2 eannot be below 1/3 by * more than E. This shows that p eannot be the limit equilibrium point of a test sequenee.
A deeentralization erfeet eauilibrium points
In this seetion it will be shown that the question whether a given behavior strategy eombination is aperfeet equilibrium point or not, ean be deeided loeally at the information sets of the game. The eoneept of a loeal equilibrium point will be introdueed whieh is defined by eonditions on the loeal strategies. As we shall see, in perturbed games these loeal eonditions are equivalent to the usual global equilibrium eonditions. On the basis of this result a deeentralized deseription of aperfeet equilibrium point will be developed.
Notational eonvention: Let r be an extensive game and let bi be a behavior strategy of a personal player i in r. Let biu be a loeal strategy at an information set u of player i.
The notation bi/biu is used for that behavior strategy whieh results from bi if the loeal strategy assigned by bi to u is ehanged to biu whereas the loeal strategies assigned by bi to other information sets remain unehanged. Obviously p(x,b) is the conditional probab1l1ty that x 1s reached by the play if b is played and u is reached. Since p(x,b) is positive for every vertex x, the conditional real1-zation probability p(x,b) is defined for every vertex x.
Let x be a vertex and let z be an endpoint after x. We define a second type of conditional realization probability n(x,z,b) which is the probability that z will be reached if b is played and x has been reached. Obviously we have Proof: The assertion of the lemma follows from the fact that the local strategy at u does not influence the realization probabilities of endpoints which do not come after vertices of u. In the foll~wing we shall show that biv is a local best reply to bibi in r. This is a contradiction to (49).
It follows by lemma 4 that we have (50) for every XEV and every loeal strategy biv Cf player i at v. Moreover the information set v has been seleeted in such a way that bi and~i assign the same probabilities to ehoiees at information sets u after v. Therefore we have (51 ) for every local strategy biv at v and for every XEV. (47) together with (50) and (51) test sequence r , r ,...
Proof:
The theorem is an immediate consequence of lemma 7 and the difinition of a perfect equi1ibrium point.
10. The agent normal form and the existence of a perfect equi1ibrium point
In this section the concept of an agent normal form will be introduced. The p1ayers of the agent normal form are the agents of the information sets described by H.W. Kuhn in his interpretation of the extensive form (Kuhn 1953 ). An agent receives the expected payoff of the p1ayer to whom he belongs. The agent normal form contains all the information which is needed in order to compute the perfect equilibrium points of the extensive game. With the he1p of the agent normal form one can prove the existence of perfect equilibrium points for extensive games with perfect reca11.
The agent normal form: Let r be an extensive game and let u1,...,QN be the information sets of the personal A mixed strategy qi for G is a mixed strategy for G = (G,n) if qi satisfies the following condition: to a best reply in G. Therefore the assertion follows by lemma 7. A limit equilibrium point q of a test sequence G ,G ,... is a mixed strategy combination for G, such that there 1s 1 2 at least one sequence q ,q ,... of equilibrium points k Ak * q for Gwhich for k+m converges to q . A perfectl 1brium point of G is a mixed strategy combination q for Gwhich is a limit equilibrium point of at least one test Proof: It follows by lemma 8 that a one-to-one relationship between the test sequences for rand for G can be established where a perturbed game of r corresponds to its perturbed agent normal form. Therefore a limit equilibrium point of one of both sequences induces a limit equilibrium point of the other one.
Existence of perfect equilibrium points: In the following it will be shown that every extensive game r with perfect recall has at least one perfect equilibrium point.
In order to prove this, we make use of theorem 4. An infinite sequence of mixed strategy combinations , 2 -k q ,q ,... is called a substitute sequence for q if q -k converges to q for k+m and every q is completely mixed.
A strategy qi or a strategy combination q is called a , 2 best reE!x to the substitute sequence q ,q ,... if qi or k q,resp. is a best reply to every q in the sequence. continuity of Hi maximum operator on both sides we and the continuity proit is clear that (57) retake limits for k+m. This is an equilibrium point.
Associated perturbed normal forms:
Let G = (fi"...,finiH) be a normal form, let q = (CJ"...,qn) be a completely mixed strategy combination for G and let E be a positive -37 -number such that for i = 1,...,n we have qi(~i»E for every XiEßi. For every triple (G,q,E) of th!s kind we define an associated perturbed normal form G = (G,") , where the minimum probabilities of the pure strategies for Gare as follows: (58) if~i is not a best reply to q in G is a best reply to q in G for i = 1,...,n and for every XiEni" Obviously " the condition that the minimum probabilities for strategies of a player sum up to less than 1. '" to g . The definition of a perfect equilibrium point requires A1 A2 1 2 that such sequences G , G ,... and q ,~,... ex1st. k Let Ti be the set of all those pure strategies of player i which appear with more than minimum probability in qk, i.e. we can use subsequences 1 2 and q , q ,...
-39 -Since every~i Wi~h q~(~i) > 0 is in T~and :very~i€T~is a best reply to q in G, the mixed strategy qi is a best reply to gk for k -1,2,... . The qk (are completely mixed and 1 2 * 1 2 q , q , ... converges to q . The sequence q , q ,... is a * * substitute sequence for 9 and q is a best reply to this * sequence. q is a substitute perfect equilibriurnpoint.
Two counterexamples
One might be tempted to think that a perfect equilibrium point of the normal form G of an extensive game r with perfect recall always corresponds to a perfect equilibrium point of r. If this were the case on would not need the agent normal form. In the following we shall present two counterexamples. The first one is quite simple but less satisfactory than the second one.
The first counterexample: The extensive game of figure 2 has exactly one perfect equilibrium point, namely the pure strategy combination (Rr,L). Here Rr refers to that pure strategy of player 1 where he chooses R at the origin and r at his other information set. The fact that this is the only perfect equilibrium point follows immediately subgame perfectness of perfect equilibrium points. The second counterexample: Consider the equilibrium points (Rl, L2, R3) and (Rr, L2, R3) of the qame of figure 3. As we shall see both of these equilibrium points are perfeet in the normal form but they fail to be perfeet in the extensive form.
Perfectness in the normal form:
It is sufficient to show that (Rl, L2, R3) is aperfeet equilibrium point of the normal form,if this is the ease the same must be true for (Rr, L2, R3) sinee in the normal form Rr is a duplieate of Rl.
In order to show the perfeetness of (Rl, L2,R3) we eonstruct the following substitute sequence q1,q2,... : In qk every pure strategy wh1ch does not occur in (Rl, L2, R3) 
